

Research Report

# An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea's Relationship with Africa: From the Cold War to Now

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## Map of Countries where North Korea has Activities in Africa

There are 36 countries mentioned in this report that have ongoing or past relationships with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The map below also includes two countries, which were targets of cyberattacks initiated by North Korean hackers.



## Research Methodology

Publicly Available Information (PAI) was used to construct a database of North Korea's activities in Africa. An extensive search of reputable secondary sources was conducted which consisted of news articles, reports and resolutions by the United Nations (UN), briefs from think tanks, academic articles, reports from watchdog organizations, etc. Each incident was entered into a database with as much metadata as possible. Not surprisingly, the sources often omitted the project or transaction value, which is a key piece of information. In cases where the project value is mentioned, however, attempts were made to verify the stated figure through triangulation. Additionally, existing databases were scoured for relevant activities and these include e.g. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Traders Database and the UN Comtrade Database.

## Preface

The history of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's involvement in Africa can be traced back to the Cold War when the country supported several liberation movements on the continent. North Korea's main agenda in targeting African countries was to support the Non-Aligned Movement, gain recognition, look for funding sources outside of East European countries, and decrease South Korea's legitimacy. This was done through supporting African states in their fight for independence, which, in some cases, involved aiding rebel and guerrilla groups.

The Sochin Research Institute attempted an exploratory look into North Korea's footprint in Africa dating from the Cold War era to today. Our broad stroke on North Korea's activities in Africa shows its fairly diversified "investment portfolio" (mainly illegal at this point) ranging from wildlife product trade, construction of statues and monuments, sending medical workers and doctors to building arms and establishing military relations. About two-thirds of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have actively engaged in both export and import relations with North Korea over the years. Although the East African Community (EAC) was founded more recently than ECOWAS, two-thirds of its members too established trade relations with the DPRK. Many countries not in those blocks also traded with the DPRK. These trading relations earned the DPRK much needed foreign currency to finance its nuclear weapons program. However, as the UN sanctions started to take effect, North Korea's trade relationships with a lot of African countries has virtually come to a halt.

Some experts may foresee that this vacuum in the trade market(s) between North Korea and Africa would eventually lead to illegal activities by the DPRK such as their hackers engaging in cybercrime. Others may foresee that the Cold War camaraderie established between North Korea and many African countries may give rise to an unexpected second wind. However, this report argues that nobody can dispute the fact that North Korea has always operated as an independent entity, not as a proxy, during the Cold War. Thus it will most likely continue to opportunistically pursue endeavors on the continent in a bid to fund its weapons of mass destruction program and ensure the survival of the Pyongyang regime.

## Activities During Kim Il-Sung Regime (October 1966 to July 1994)

### DPRK Supports African Liberation Movements

The history of the DPRK's involvement in Africa can be traced back to the Cold War when it supported several liberation movements on the continent. The main agenda of North Korea was targeting African countries in order to gain recognition, obtain support for the Non-Aligned Movement, and decrease South Korea's legitimacy. This was done through supporting African states in their fight for independence.

For example, the relationship with Zimbabwe and North Korea started in the 1970s when the DPRK trained an armed faction of Zimbabwe's now-ruling ZANU-PF party in what was then the British colony of Rhodesia. Following Zimbabwe's independence from British rule in April 1980, then North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung continued the good relations with Robert Mugabe and the DPRK continued to supply Mugabe with military assistance. This included helping to create a national army from the two former Rhodesian guerrilla forces as well as training a wing of Zimbabwe's army known as the Fifth Brigade. In 1981, the North Koreans sent US\$18 million in small arms and ammunition as well as 106 instructors to train 3,500 members of the Fifth Brigade (DuPre, Kasprzyk and Stott 2016, p. 11), which was under the direct control of Mugabe. A few years later, the Fifth Brigade killed an estimated 20,000 people in the region of Matabeleland, home to Mugabe's main political rival Joshua Nkomo (Dzirutwe 2019).

Namibia's main liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), received military training from the DPRK during the country's insurgency against South Africa in 1964. This fact is mentioned in the biography of San Nujoma, SWAPO's founding president (Saunders 2019, p. 59). Additionally, Nujoma visited Pyongyang twice in the 1980s and during one of the visits requested military assistance from the North Korean government. It remains unclear, however, if the DPRK "ever supplied SWAPO with any military hardware" (ibid) at the time. In spite of the UN sanctions imposed against North Korea in 2006, the UN's Panel of Experts on North Korea published a report in February 2006 that outlined ongoing relations between Namibia's army and North Korea (Grobler 2016). Furthermore, Namibia and North Korea signed several bilateral agreements in 2008 and military co-operation continues, even with UN Security Council Resolution 1718 in place. During President Hage Geingob's State of the Nation address to parliament in 2016, he pointed to North Korea's support during the struggle for independence as justification for their continued relations (ibid).

North Korea also enjoyed a good relationship with all Ugandan leaders, starting with Apollo Milton Obote who led Uganda to independence in 1962 and served as the country's first prime minister. Following Idi Amin's overthrow of Obote in 1971,

North Korea's relationship with Uganda continued and the former offered military training and supplies to the new regime. After Yoweri Museveni assumed the presidency in 1986, Uganda received military support in form of a US\$4 million loan, as well as 40 military advisors (The East African 2014).

A final example is the relationship between North Korea and Mozambique that is rooted in Cold War camaraderie. The implementation report submitted by Mozambique to the UN Security Council in May 2020 stated that since an agreement in 1978, bilateral relations have been "characterized by solidarity, cordiality and friendship, including the implementation of economic and social projects" (Zwirko 2020).

### **Illegal Wildlife Trade**

In 1989, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) reported that the North Korean embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe, was "deeply involved in the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade" (Environmental Investigation Agency 1989, p. 22). "Virtually the entire staff of the diplomatic missions of North Korea [in Zimbabwe and Zambia] are involved in the illegal rhino horn trade," the EIA noted in the report. Once the horn arrived in the North Korean embassy, it was sent by diplomatic bags to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and from there to South Yemen. Another example involving staff from a North Korean embassy was a case in Zambia in the mid-1990s where they "engaged in trafficking ivory, gemstones and rhino horns, which were sold to China and some Middle Eastern and Asian countries" (ibid, p. 13).

Since the introduction of UN sanctions against North Korea in 2006, its government has been more desperate to raise money through trafficking illicit wildlife products. In one instance, two North Korean nationals were arrested for possessing illegal rhino horn in Mozambique in May 2015. They were in a Toyota car registered to the North Korean Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa. One person was a senior diplomat at the Embassy in Pretoria while the other was a suspected North Korean agent. The duo was stopped in their vehicle in Maputo, Mozambique, and found in possession of US\$100,000 in cash and 4.5 kg of rhino horn (Rademeyer 2017). Another instance involved two North Korean nationals travelling on diplomatic passports who were detained separately at Bole International Airport in Ethiopia in 2016. One was transiting from Zimbabwe en route to China carrying 200 Ivory bangles, while the other person was en route to China with 76 pieces of worked Ivory (ibid).

## Activities During Multiple North Korean Regimes

### Construction of Statues and Monuments

The North Korea based construction company Mansudae Art Studio was founded in 1959 and through its international division, the Mansudae Overseas Project (MOP), has been exporting art and cheap labor to Africa since the 1970s. It has constructed statues and museums as well as parliament buildings and state houses. Bronze statues are found in at least 16 countries across the continent and until 2000, the DPRK donated statues at no cost to the recipient country and only thereafter received payment for its work (Goff 2016). Through this scheme, the DPRK attempted to expand its “overseas network in order to win the backing of smaller states in a battle for diplomatic support in the United Nations” (Pearson 2016).

In Namibia, MOP has been involved in a number of construction projects such as building The State House, the Independence Memorial, the Heroes’ Acre, and the Okahandja Military Museum. According to the newspaper The Namibian, the country spent at least US\$91.5 million on North Korean construction work between 2002 and 2017 (Pyongyang Papers 2019).

In Angola, MOP constructed the Kifangondo Battle Monument in 2004, the Agonstinho Neto Mausoleum in the capital at the cost of US\$40 million in 2007 (Sturdivant-Thompson and Curnow n.d.), and the Peace Monument in 2012.

In Zimbabwe, MOP has been involved in a number of projects including statues of the late president Robert Mugabe that were delivered at a total cost of US\$5 million in 2016 and a statue of the controversial revolutionary and politician Joshua Nkomo, at a cost of US\$600,000, that was erected in 2010 but later removed.

A very expensive statue built by MOP was the African Renaissance Monument completed at a cost of US\$27 million in Dakar, Senegal, in 2010 (Baecker 2011). It is also noteworthy for being the tallest statue in Africa.

Other examples of where DPRK commercial companies have been involved in constructions in Africa include Le Monument Sarakawa/Eyadema Statue in Togo, the Laurent Desire Kabila Statue in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the National Museum and Art Gallery as well as the Three Dikgosis Monument Gaborone in Botswana, the statue of King Behanzin Ahomey in Benin, and the Somora Machel Statue in Mozambique.

In 2016, the UN Security Council imposed new sanctions against the DPRK aimed at cutting the country’s annual export volume by a quarter (Pearson 2016). Amongst a wide range of measures, the sanctions targeted the export of coal, minerals, and



labor as well as statues. MOP itself was sanctioned by the UN Security Council's Resolution 2371 (2017) when its assets were frozen because the company generated revenue for the Government of the DPRK or the Workers' Party of Korea (United Nations 2017). Despite the various sanctions, it is estimated that MOP has earned US\$160 million since 2000 (Public Delivery 2021) (Pearson 2016) and it purportedly still operates in some African countries.

**Table 1: Notable construction projects done by DRPK commercial companies**

| Pre 2006 UN Sanctions    |  |                |
|--------------------------|--|----------------|
| Year/Country             | Project  | Amount in US\$ |
| 1969 / Madagascar        | Presidential Iavoloha Palace and agricultural waterways          | Donation       |
| 1974 / Togo              | Le monument Sarakawa/Eyadema statue                              | n/a            |
| 1981 / Zimbabwe          | National Heroes' Acre  | n/a            |
| 1984 /Ethiopia           | Tiglachin monument   | Donation       |
| 1984 / Equatorial Guinea | Assistance in finishing construction of Equatoguinean parliament | 10 million     |
| 2002-2008 / Namibia      | State House  | 27.6 million   |
| 2002 / Namibia           | Heroes' Acre   | 7.3 million    |
| 2002 - DRC               | Laurent Desire Kabila  | n/a            |
| 2004 / Namibia           | Okahandja Military Museum  | 2.0 million    |
| 2004 / Botswana          | National Museum and Art Gallery                                  | 1.1 million    |
| 2005 / Botswana          | Three Dikgosis monument Gaborone                                 | n/a            |
| 2006 / Benin             | Statue of King Behanzin Ahomey                                   | n/a            |

| Post 2006 UN Sanctions |                                    |                |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|
| Year/Country           | Project                            | Amount in US\$ |
| 2007 / Angola          | Agonstinho Neto Mausoleum          | 40 million     |
| 2010-2014 / Namibia    | Independence Memorial <sup>1</sup> | 10.9 million   |
| 2010 / Senegal         | African Renaissance Monument       | 27 million     |
| 2010 / Zimbabwe        | Joshua Nkomo statue                | 600,000        |
| 2016 / Zimbabwe        | Two Robert Mugabe statues          | 5 million      |

Source: Compiled from multiple sources

<sup>1</sup> Amount quoted by Grobler, 2013 was converted from South African Rand to US Dollars using historical exchange rate of 1 USD = 13.76 ZAR for June 13, 2013.

## DPRK Clinics and Doctors Practicing Illegal Medicine in African Countries

Doctors from the DPRK have operated clinics and practiced medicine, both legally and illegally, in many African countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Libya.<sup>2</sup> Some of these operations, however, have been closed as host countries enforce UN sanctions.

According to the U.S. government funded news service Radio Free Asia, a total of 12 North Korean medical clinics have been operating in eight Tanzania cities since 1991 (Hong n.d.). North Korea dispatched around 100 doctors and nurses every year and the clinics generated US\$1-1.3 million per year, of which 90 percent is returned to the regime in Pyongyang. In 2016, however, the Tanzanian government ordered the immediate closure of two North Korean clinics in its capital because the facilities were using fake medicine, had unqualified doctors, prescribed ineffective treatments, and even lacked a business registration (Hong 2016). Moreover, it is alleged that the doctors did not have work permits.

Around 150 medical workers are reported to be present in Mozambique (Hong n.d.) and they too were accused of wrongful medical practices. Six North Korean doctors assigned to the Pemba Provincial Hospital were criminally charged in 2019 for setting up a private clinic allegedly using equipment from the Mozambican National Health System (Club of Mozambique 2019). Despite these incidents and UN sanctions aimed at cutting off Pyongyang's revenue from labor exports, the Yonhap News Agency (Yi 2020) reported that Mozambique's government admitted to the presence of 97 North Korean doctors in the country. In a report to the UN Security Council, the Mozambique government decided to "suspend the protocols and terminate contracts expiring in 2020 and 2021, though it did not specify any detailed plans to repatriate the doctors" (ibid). This development occurred after the UN Panel of Experts accused Mozambique in the past of "engaging in military and other types of cooperation with North Korean individuals and entities in violation of sanctions" (Zwirko 2020).

Nigeria has also been getting medical doctors from North Korea dating as far back as 2005. Since then, Nigeria has had amicable relations with the doctors coming into the country under an agreement and labor contract between the DPRK and the Nigerian Ministry of Health. In October 2012, Nigerian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Viola Onwuliri visited North Korea for three days during which she completed an inter-government agreement "on cooperation in the fields of the economy, science and technology" (North Korea Leadership Watch 2012). This agreement may have

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<sup>2</sup> A news report states that there were hundreds of North Korean medical doctors in Libya who had worked there for some years. Six of them were caught smuggling gold and medical supplies out of the country in 2015, allegedly following orders from the North Korean embassy (Daily NK 2015).

included an extension of the program under which the doctors were employed in Potiskum, a local governmental area in Nigeria. In December 2012, the North Korea and Nigeria investment commissions completed a memorandum of understanding and other cooperation agreements after another Nigerian delegation visited Pyongyang.

### **Arms and Military Relations between North Korea and African Countries**

North Korea’s security, diplomatic and economic relationships with African countries often began during the Cold War period, which coincided with many independence movements on the continent. While ideological ties sometimes formed the basis of the relationships, African countries were also attracted to North Korea because it provided low-cost arms transfers, helped build domestic security infrastructure, and even provided guest workers or security personnel needed to build up domestic forces. Fellow socialist states such as Ghana, Egypt, and Guinea were natural allies for North Korea in the 1960s and this was followed by North Korea converting its diplomatic relations into security partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s with countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, and Ethiopia (Ramani 2021). Until 2017, North Korea routinely used its embassy in Cairo to transfer weapons to Egypt and other African countries (ibid). A small representation of arms transfers is captured by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and is shown below.

**Table 2: Transfer of Major Weapons by North Korea to African States From 1980 to 2020**

| Recipient | Year of Weapon Order | Year of Weapon Delivery | Weapon Description                  | Quantity |
|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| Egypt     | 1983                 | 1984-1987               | Self-propelled MRL                  | 145      |
| Ethiopia  | 2000                 | 2000                    | APC                                 | 10       |
| Libya     | 1979                 | 1980                    | Self-propelled MRL                  | 10       |
|           | 1995                 | 1999                    | Surface-to surface missile          | 5        |
| Tanzania  | 1979                 | 1980                    | Landing craft                       | 4        |
| Uganda    | 1987                 | 1987                    | Self-propelled MRL                  | 10       |
|           | 1987                 | 1987                    | APC                                 | 14       |
|           | 1987                 | 1987                    | Portable Surface-to surface missile | 100      |

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

More recently, North Korea is still constructing or running arms factories, selling military equipment, and training security personnel in many parts of Africa. These

activities include the production of small arms ammunition in countries such as the DRC where UN peacekeepers recovered “six different types of North Korean-made ammunition from armed groups” (The Sentinel 2020, p. 6) in 2013. It also encompasses high end weaponry such as the sale of parts and technology of Scud and Rodong missiles to e.g. Egypt and Libya (The Chosunilbo 2006). Such transactions raise significant amounts of revenue for the country. For example, The Korean Institute for Defense Analysis estimated that North Korea earned between US\$700 million to US\$1 billion a year from exporting weapons and trading drugs and counterfeit money (ibid).

It is thus not surprising that the UN sanctions against the DPRK, starting in 2006, attempted to curtail the revenue stream from defense dealings. Nevertheless, a 2017 report from the UN’s Panel of Experts outlined how globally, North Korea “is flouting sanctions with trade in prohibited goods, with evasion techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication” (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 4). Despite the sanctions, the report mentioned that North Korea had continued arms trading and military cooperation in Africa, including on a large scale. Pyongyang’s continued military support outlined in the 2017 report involved e.g. Angola, the DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Mozambique, Uganda, and Sudan. A 2014 report by the same panel also implicated Tanzania for hosting 18 North Korean technicians involved in the refurbishment of Tanzanian F-6 fighter jets and other military aircraft at the Mwanza Air Force base (Uganda, Tanzania in trouble with UN over ‘arms deals’ with North Korea 2014).

According to the 2017 report, the UN will investigate North Korea’s military cooperation with 11 African countries. Some examples of support found in the Panel of Experts report include:

- In 2011, Angola was implicated in the purchase of North Korean naval patrol boats from a North Korean company known as Saengpil Associated Company, a known alias of the Green Pine Associated Corporation (Macdonald 2016). The firm has taken over the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) after the latter was put on the UN sanctions list. The sale of the naval boats occurred before Green Pine Associated Corporation was sanctioned as an entity although the sale did violate UNSC resolution 1718 and 1874. Mr. Kim Hyok Chan, a North Korean diplomat and representative on Green Pine, negotiated the contracts, sourced spare parts and oversaw the refurbishment of the navy patrol boats (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 70). Even after the sale, Angola received marine engines and replacements parts for the 18 boats which constituted a violation of the UN sanctions, as reported by the Washington Times (Gertz) in 2015. Additionally, North Korea purportedly trained the Angolan presidential guards in the form of martial arts training, firearms training, and parade

ground training (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 45). This violated resolution 1874, which prohibits the hosting of North Korean personnel from the DPRK.

- In the DRC, automatic pistols and other small arms arrived from the DPRK. The pistols were issued to the Presidential Guard as well as to special units of the national police (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 41).
- In 2016, Egypt intercepted a vessel close to the Suez Canal that was commanded by a DPRK captain. The ship was transporting cargo that included 30,000 PG-7 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and related components hidden under 2,3000 tonnes of limonite (Iron ore). The RPGs had an estimated value of US\$6 million (Ramani 2021) and were “the largest interdicted ammunition consignment in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 28).
- A shipment of military radio communications products and accessories en route to Eritrea was interdicted in July 2016 (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 32). Although the shipment originated in China, the products were deemed a violation of the arms embargo because the DPRK was involved in the cargo’s manufacture and logistics.
- A large arms deal worth US\$6 million was made between a company controlled by the Government of Mozambique and the representative of the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation. Mr. Choe Kwang Su, the company’s representative, is the third secretary at the North Korean embassy in Pretoria. The contract was for the supply of “man-portable air defence system components and training equipment and P-18 early warning radar components, and to refurbish T-55 tanks and modernize the surface-to-air Pechora missile system” (ibid, p. 40).
- In Uganda, its national implementation report confirmed that the DPRK was training its air force pilots and technicians as part of a contract that would expire in 2018 (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 46). Additionally, the Panel of Experts was investigating the training of Ugandan military and police forces by North Koreans.
- North Korea supplied Sudan with 100 122-mm precision guided rocket control sections and 80 sophisticated air-to-ground missiles through two deals valued at roughly US\$6.4 million (ibid. p. 41). The deals were reportedly signed by KOMID’s president in 2013 and used a front company called Chosun Keuncheon Technology Trade Company. KOMID, North Korea’s main military contractor, has been a UN designated entity since 2009.

## **Trade between African Countries and DPRK**

A large number of African countries have had trade relations with North Korea and economic ties have been a lucrative way for Pyongyang to earn hard currency. According to the UN Comtrade Database, 31 African countries imported goods worth US\$731.6 million from North Korea, whereas 30 African countries exported goods worth US\$197.8 million to North Korea between 2011 and 2020 (see Table 3). A full list of the yearly trade by country is given in the appendix.

Ethiopia is a good example of a major trading partner with North Korea, with particularly high volumes of imports occurring between 2011 and 2015. This has made Ethiopia incur a large trade deficit with the DPRK. Ethiopia purchased natural resources such as coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore from North Korea. It also imported flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel iron and steel/ ferro-alloys, iron and steel angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel worth over US\$2.7 million from North Korea during the above period.

Egypt is another country that has a large trade deficit with the DPRK even though it was the fourth largest African exporter of goods overall to North Korea (see Table 3).

Between 2011 and 2015, the Seychelles, Ethiopia and Cameroon were the highest importers of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore from North Korea.

South Africa was the largest exporter of goods to North Korea despite the sanctions imposed against North Korea. 2011 was the most active year in this ten year period, though trade declined gradually in the ensuing years.

**Table 3: Balance of Trade in US\$ millions (totals for 2011-2020)**

| Country       | Imports      | Exports      | BoT           |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| South Africa  | 19.76        | 73.74        | 54.0          |
| Senegal       | 4.28         | 15.11        | 10.8          |
| DRC           | 4.10         | 7.31         | 3.2           |
| Cameroon      | 1.07         | 3.62         | 2.5           |
| Lesotho       | 0.10         | 0.04         | -0.1          |
| Sudan         | 0.07         | -            | -0.1          |
| Kenya         | 0.30         | 0.09         | -0.2          |
| Namibia       | 0.30         | 0.01         | -0.3          |
| Sierra Leone  | 1.06         | 0.13         | -0.9          |
| Mauritius     | 1.11         | 0.00         | -1.1          |
| Botswana      | 1.53         | 0.01         | -1.5          |
| Guinea        | 11.15        | 9.32         | -1.8          |
| Madagascar    | 4.56         | 0.33         | -4.2          |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 6.05         | 0.56         | -5.5          |
| Togo          | 10.26        | 3.17         | -7.1          |
| Rwanda        | 9.26         | 1.15         | -8.1          |
| Uganda        | 19.36        | 9.54         | -9.8          |
| Tanzania      | 17.58        | 5.70         | -11.9         |
| Zimbabwe      | 12.40        | 0.10         | -12.3         |
| Mali          | 17.17        | 0.18         | -17.0         |
| Seychelles    | 26.58        | 0.83         | -25.8         |
| Algeria       | 28.04        | 0.00         | -28.0         |
| Benin         | 33.82        | 4.83         | -29.0         |
| Zambia        | 38.92        | 6.23         | -32.7         |
| Nigeria       | 63.96        | 25.13        | -38.8         |
| Ghana         | 42.67        | 1.22         | -41.5         |
| Mozambique    | 52.91        | 4.00         | -48.9         |
| Burkina Faso  | 63.79        | 8.25         | -55.5         |
| Ethiopia      | 60.96        | 3.29         | -57.7         |
| Egypt         | 92.52        | 13.90        | -78.6         |
| Angola        | 86.00        | 0.01         | -86.0         |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>731.6</b> | <b>197.8</b> | <b>-533.8</b> |

Source: UN Comtrade Database


Table 3 shows that North Korea's African trade partners incurred a trade deficit of just over half a billion US dollars. This represents a significant amount of foreign currency received by North Korea over a ten-year period.

However, particularly the import of goods to African countries from North Korea has declined drastically, as seen in Chart 1, and this is possibly related to UN sanctions being enforced or front companies operating for North Korea being shut



down. Moreover, exports from the African continent to North Korea in 2020 were just 14 percent of the amount recorded in 2011. Only Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Senegal, the DRC, and Namibia imported US\$8 million worth of goods from North Korea in 2020.

**Chart 1: Total Value of Import and Export of Goods between African Countries and North Korea in US\$ millions (2011-2020)**



Source: UN Comtrade Database

## Sanctions Against DPRK

### UN Resolutions against DPRK

The UN Security Council has adopted nine rounds of sanctions against North Korea in response to the country’s nuclear and missile activities that began in 2006. Additionally, the resolutions give “UN member states the authority to interdict and inspect North Korean cargo within their territory, and subsequently seize and dispose of illicit shipments” (Arms Control Association 2018).

There are two bodies that monitor the implementation of the sanctions: the first is the 1718 Committee and the second is the Panel of Experts. The panel produces regular reports to the Security.



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| <p><b>Resolution 1718</b><br/><b>(14 October 2006)</b></p> | <p>It was adopted after the first nuclear test by North Korea on 9 October 2006. It imposes on member states e.g. arms embargos, asset freezes of entities designated by the Security Council as providing support for North Korea’s nuclear, missile and other WMD programs, and a ban on a range of imports and exports from to DPRK. It also established the 1718 Committee.</p>  |
| <p><b>Resolution 1874</b><br/><b>(12 June 2009)</b></p>    | <p>It was adopted in response to the second nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009. The resolution expanded measures related to arms exports and imports to include all arms and related material (except the import of small arms and light weapons and their related material). It also called upon UN member states to prevent the provision of financial services or transfer of financial resources that could contribute to prohibited activities. Per the resolution, states must report on inspections, seizures and disposals, as well as the sale, supply or transfer of small arms or light weapons, among others. The resolution also established a seven-member Panel of Experts to assist the 1718 Committee.</p> |
| <p><b>Resolution 2087</b><br/><b>(22 January 2013)</b></p> | <p>It was adopted response to a North Korean satellite launch on 12 December 2012 that used ballistic missile technology. The resolution expanded on measures related to UN member states’ rights to seize and destroy materials suspected of being connected to the DPRK’s weapons development and research. It also expanded measures imposed on persons suspected of being involved in the DPRK’s nuclear program and clarified methods of material disposal. The resolution designated four individuals and six entities, and expanded designation criteria to include entities/individuals involved in the evasion of sanctions or in the violation of the resolutions.</p>   |
| <p><b>Resolution 2094</b><br/><b>(7 March 2013)</b></p>    | <p>It was adopted in response to the third nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013. The resolution expanded the prohibited items list concerning nuclear, ballistic missile and other related items, and provided a non-exhaustive list of prohibited luxury goods. It imposed targeted financial sanctions, designated additional individuals and entities, and expanded the designation criteria to include individuals and entities that have contributed to the DPRK’s prohibited programs. The resolutions also expressed concern that North Korea was abusing immunities granted to its diplomats.</p>  |

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| <p><b>Resolution 2270<br/>(2 March 2016)</b></p>     | <p>It was adopted in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016 ‘in violation and flagrant disregard’ of the relevant resolutions. It expanded the arms embargo and non-proliferation measures to include small arms and light weapons, as well as catchall provisions to ban any item relating to prohibited programs, dual-use nuclear/missile items, and the operational capabilities of DPRK’s armed forces. It established new cargo inspection and maritime procedures, and expanded financial measures. It enforced sectoral sanctions (coal, minerals and fuel ban) and prohibited their procurement and/or transfer by UN member states. It also added new items to the luxury goods ban. The resolution clarified aspects of the ban on hosting DPRK trainers, advisors or other officials for policy, paramilitary and military training. It also banned specialized training or teaching for DPRK nationals in specific fields that could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation activities. It required UN member states to expel DPRK diplomats and foreign nationals involved in illicit activities, and designated additional individuals and entities.</p> |
| <p><b>Resolution 2321<br/>(30 November 2016)</b></p> | <p>It was adopted in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on September 9. The resolution called on member states to reduce the number of DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts. Additionally, member states were directed to limit the number of bank accounts held by diplomats and missions. Sales of statues and helicopters by North Korea were prohibited as well as the sale or transfer of iron or iron ore and coal.</p>   |
| <p><b>Resolution 2371<br/>(5 August 2017)</b></p>    | <p>This resolution was passed in response to North Korea’s two intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in July. It targeted North Korea’s principal exports, imposing a total ban on all exports of coal, iron, iron ore lead, lead ore and seafood. The United States Mission to the United Nation claimed that these exports earned North Korea US\$1 billion of hard currency per year (The United States Mission to United Nations 2017). The mission also claimed that North Korea earned a total of US\$3 billion per year from exports. The resolution also prohibited joint ventures between North Korea and other nations as well as banned countries from allowing in additional North Korean laborers. Again, it added new sanctions against North Korean individuals and entities such as the Foreign Trade Bank.</p>  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Resolution 2375<br/>(11 September<br/>2017)</b> | It was adopted after North Korea's sixth nuclear test. The resolution e.g. fully bans textile exports, freezes the amount of crude oil imports, banned all natural gas and condensate imports, and prohibited member states from providing authorizations for North Korean nationals to work in their jurisdictions. The ban on joint ventures is expanded to include cooperative entities or the expansion of joint ventures with DPRK entities or individuals. |
| <b>Resolution 2379<br/>(22 December<br/>2017)</b>  | The resolution was adopted after a ICBM launch on November 29. It designated an additional 16 individuals and 1 entity to the sanction list, banned North Korean exports of food, agricultural products, minerals machinery and electrical equipment, established caps on the import of refined petroleum and crude oil as well as directed countries to expel all North Korean workers immediately (or in two years at least).                                  |

Source: United Nations Security Council n.d.

### **African States That Implemented Sanctions against DPRK**

Many African countries are yet to implement the above UN sanctions against North Korea. The UN's Panel of Experts, supporting the 1718 Committee, reported that a high number of African countries had not reported to the UN. As of 1 September 2016, only eight African UN member states had reported to the committee. African UN member states that have reported to UN committee pursuant to these resolutions include:

#### ***Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006)***

This includes Uganda under document S/AC.49/2010/12 dated 13 August 2010, Nigeria under document S/AC.49/2011/1 dated 3 February 2011, South Africa under document S/AC.49/2006/40 dated 7 December 2006, Morocco under document S/AC.49/2014/7 dated 24 December 2014, Algeria under document S/AC.49/2007/25 dated 15 May 2007, Egypt under annex document S/AC.49/2012/7 dated 29 June 2012, and Bukina Faso under document S/AC.49/2010/6 dated 4 May 2010.

#### ***Reports pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)***

South Africa under document S/AC.49/2010/14 dated 3 December 2010.

#### ***Reports pursuant to Resolution 2094 (2013)***

No countries yet to report.

**Reports pursuant to Resolution 2270 (2016)**

Egypt under S/AC.49/2016/10 document dated 27 May 2016, South Africa under S/AC.49/2016/29 report dated 8 June 2016, Uganda under document S/AC.49/2016/22 dated 6 June 2016 and Angola report under S/AC.49/2016/47 dated 25 July 2016.

Yet the list of African member states who have not complied with Resolution 2270 remains large (UN Panel of Experts 2017, p. 100). In fact, the 2017 Panel of Experts report found that Africa had the worst rate of nations reporting compliance with UN sanctions (Solomon 2017).

**Table 4: African UN Member States yet to submit National Implementation Reports (NIR) under resolution 2270**

|   |                           |
|---|---------------------------|
| 1. Algeria  | 22. Libya                 |
| 2. Botswana   | 23. Madagascar            |
| 3. Burkina Faso   | 24. Malawi                |
| 4. Cameroon   | 25. Mali                  |
| 5. Cabo Verde   | 26. Mauritania            |
| 6. Central African Republic                                 | 27. Morocco               |
| 7. Chad   | 28. Mozambique            |
| 8. Congo  | 29. Niger                 |
| 9. Côte D'Ivoire  | 30. Nigeria               |
| 10. Democratic Republic of the Congo                        | 31. Rwanda                |
| 11. Equatorial Guinea                                       | 32. Sao Tome and Principe |
| 12. Eritrea   | 33. Seychelles            |
| 13. Ethiopia ( <i>UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018</i> ) | 34. Sierra Leone          |
| 14. Gabon   | 35. Somalia               |
| 15. Gambia  | 36. South Sudan           |
| 16. Ghana   | 37. Sudan                 |
| 17. Guinea  | 38. Swaziland             |
| 18. Guinea Bissau   | 39. Tanzania              |
| 19. Kenya   | 40. Togo                  |
| 20. Lesotho   | 41. Tunisia               |
| 21. Liberia   | 42. Zambia                |
|   | 43. Zimbabwe              |

## Activities During Kim Jung-Un Regime (April 2012 to present)

### Cyberattacks

North Korean hackers are involved in many illegal cyber activities across the globe, which seek to raise hard currency for Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction program. A confidential 2019 report by the UN estimated that the DPRK raised US\$2 billion through "widespread and increasingly sophisticated" cyberattacks (Nichols 2019). Another estimate puts the figure of extracted digital assets at US\$400 million, accumulated through at least seven attacks on cryptocurrency platforms in 2021 (Chainalysis 2022).

In many cases, cybercriminals are aligned with officials from the DPRK. A U.S. federal indictment (US Department of Justice 2021) outlined a vast array of criminal cyber activities undertaken by three North Korean computer programmers who are members of units of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), a military intelligence agency of the DPRK that some cybersecurity researchers refer to as the Lazarus Group or Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (APT 38). The three are alleged to have been involved in a criminal conspiracy to steal or extort more than US\$1.3 billion through a wide range of cyber activities that are listed in the indictment:

- Cyberattacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014 in retaliation for the movie "The Interview";
- Cyber-enabled heists from banks located in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Mexico, Malta, and Africa. The heists attempted to steal more than \$1.2 billion between 2015 and 2019;
- Cyber-enabled ATM cash out thefts such as the one from BankIslami Pakistan Limited that netted US\$6.1 million;
- Ransomware and cyber-enabled extortion such as the WannaCry 2.0 ransomware that affected hospitals, banks, and business worldwide in 2017. The Lazarus Group supposedly was behind this attack;
- Creation and deployment of malicious cryptocurrency applications that would provide the North Korean hackers a backdoor into the victims' computers;
- Targeting of hundreds of cryptocurrency companies and theft of cryptocurrency worth US\$111.7 million from companies in Slovenia, Indonesia and the US;
- Spear phishing campaigns that targeted employees of United States cleared defense contractors, energy companies, aerospace companies, technology companies, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Defense;

- Marine chain token and initial coin offering through which the DPRK secretly obtains funds from investors, controls interests in marine shipping vessels, and evades U.S. sanctions.

After stealing the cash or cryptocurrency, the hackers cover their tracks to throw off investigators by moving coins to different wallets and currencies. One of their tactics to clean dirty money is known as “peel chain” which moves money in rapid and automated transactions from one Bitcoin wallet to a new address through hundreds or thousands of transactions in a way that both hides the source of the money and lessens the risk of setting off red flags. Another method is called “chain hopping” that moves the money through different cryptocurrencies and blockchains to get it away from bitcoins (where every transaction is posted to a public ledger) and into other more private currencies. By doing this, the aim is to raise false alarms for investigators. The Lazarus Group prefers using over-the-counter operations to move millions in Bitcoin into cash.

North Korean hackers have also targeted several African countries. For example, they used backdoor malware dubbed Vyveva that was traced in an attack against a South African freight and logistics firm in 2018. Furthermore, the 2019 UN report mentioned that Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia each suffered one attack (Lederer 2019). In 2019, a Nigerian Instagram influencer by the name of Ramon ‘Hushpuppi’ Abbas participated in a US\$14.7 million cyber heist committed against a Maltese bank, the Bank of Valletta, by North Korean hackers (Dawkins 2021). The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles charged Abbas with working with the North Korean hackers to launder funds from the heist. The *Times of Malta* reported that false payments valued at €13 million were made to banks in four countries although they were later traced and reversed (ibid).

Victims of DPRK cybercrime occasionally are able to thwart attacks such as the one against an unnamed African financial institution in May 2019. Barac, a cybersecurity company based in London, detected “patterns in the metadata of a small proportion of the encrypted traffic leaving the bank’s network” (Ashford 2019). This enabled the hackers to make a small number of low-value transactions to other banks located in Bulgaria before their infiltration was stopped.

### **Circumspect Commercial Transactions**

As part of the UN’s 2016 sanctions against North Korea, member states were prohibited from procuring statues from Mansudae Art Studio because it allegedly funneled profits back to the DPRK’s government. The U.S. Treasury Department also placed the company under sanctions in the same year (The Sentinel 2020, p. 6).

In order to open new revenue streams emanating from Africa, North Korean businessmen founded a construction services company in 2018, opened U.S. dollar denominated bank accounts and started trading activities in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (The Sentry 2020). Pak Hwa Song and Hwang Kil Su, both North Korean nationals, used their DRC based Congo Aconde company to secure statue contracts and most likely engaged in money laundering for the DPRK. Congo Aconde's activities clearly circumvented sanctions adopted by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union.

The Sentinel report's author, John Dell'Osso, believes that insufficient due diligence and compliance practices, particularly in banks, exist throughout Central Africa (ibid). Even the sanctioned Mansudae Overseas Projects is believed to remain active in Africa, as it is e.g. connected to two statue projects, one in Guinea and the other in Namibia, despite UN sanctions (Choy 2020). In the case of the statue in Guinea, an unpublished report by the UN Panel of Experts claims that front companies based in Benin were used (ibid).

Another way to bypass UN sanctions is to alter company names and then register them in African countries. For example, the Zimbabwean registered company Mansudae Boka Design Company (MBDC) bears a close resemblance to the sanctioned Mansudae Overseas Project Group and the two entities purportedly have ties. While MBDC has a Zimbabwean director, it also has two majority shareholders who are the North Koreans called Hyo Song Pak and Kyong Chol Yun (Pyongyang Papers 2019). MBDC has contracted with a Zimbabwean government department to build statues. In addition to allegedly fronting MBDC, the Boka family is also "suspected of supplying Zimbabwean rag tobacco to DPRK, in violation of sanction prohibiting the export of luxury goods to North Korea" (ibid).

Korea General Corporation for External Construction is another construction firm mentioned in the literature for its operations in Africa. It maintains relations with the sanctioned Mansudae Overseas Project Group. Despite the sanctions against the firm, there are reports that Mansudae built the State House and Independence Memorial Museum in Windhoek, Namibia, and had secured another contract to build a defense headquarters and a munitions factory (ibid). In response to reporting, Namibia's Foreign Minister Nandi-Ndaitwah is quoted as saying that "while Namibia remains committed to the implementation of all UN sanctions the warm diplomatic relations with the DPRK will be maintained" (ibid).



## Appendix

### Trade Between African Countries and North Korea (2011-2020)

**Table 1: Import of Goods from North Korea, figures in US\$ millions (ranked by total in descending order)**

| Country       | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  | 2018  | 2019 | 2020 | Total |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Egypt         | 24.03 | 21.46 | 20.12 | 15.82 | 5.99  | 5.10  | -     | -     | -    | -    | 92.5  |
| Angola        | 1.30  | 4.65  | 1.87  | 5.45  | 44.08 | 2.62  | 22.91 | 3.13  | -    | -    | 86.0  |
| Nigeria       | -     | 0.03  | 4.67  | 25.53 | 10.64 | 10.91 | 4.85  | 4.63  | 2.70 | -    | 64.0  |
| Burkina Faso  | 0.09  | 0.08  | 7.29  | 0.02  | 35.75 | 7.59  | 7.65  | 4.47  | 0.84 | -    | 63.8  |
| Ethiopia      | 12.93 | 15.36 | 10.63 | 5.13  | 5.20  | 5.33  | 4.41  | 1.97  | -    | -    | 61.0  |
| Mozambique    | 1.01  | 3.46  | 8.49  | 13.97 | -     | 10.87 | 5.90  | 9.21  | -    | -    | 52.9  |
| Ghana         | 5.47  | 0.46  | 0.23  | 0.14  | 6.72  | 4.09  | 11.66 | 6.15  | 7.75 | -    | 42.7  |
| Zambia        | 0.36  | 1.59  | 0.22  | 1.24  | 6.16  | 6.01  | 1.63  | 20.09 | 0.85 | 0.76 | 38.9  |
| Benin         | 10.06 | 3.22  | 0.95  | 5.04  | 11.70 | 0.06  | 0.07  | 2.69  | 0.03 | -    | 33.8  |
| Algeria       | 15.36 | 1.81  | 2.44  | 2.69  | 2.22  | 2.33  | 1.20  | -     | -    | -    | 28.0  |
| Seychelles    | 0.06  | 8.23  | 1.59  | 5.04  | 2.28  | 1.95  | 1.57  | 2.41  | 3.45 | -    | 26.6  |
| South Africa  | 3.60  | 1.95  | 3.05  | 1.50  | 4.93  | 2.73  | 0.25  | 0.35  | 0.28 | 1.10 | 19.8  |
| Uganda        | 0.53  | 0.94  | 0.87  | 9.48  | 1.14  | 0.46  | 0.69  | 0.86  | -    | 4.39 | 19.4  |
| Tanzania      | 4.41  | 1.27  | 2.54  | 4.74  | 2.20  | 1.07  | 0.64  | 0.69  | -    | -    | 17.6  |
| Mali          | 0.30  | 5.16  | -     | -     | -     | 1.74  | 9.97  | -     | -    | -    | 17.2  |
| Zimbabwe      | 1.34  | 1.53  | 1.20  | 0.78  | 0.68  | 1.06  | 0.54  | 0.50  | 4.09 | 0.68 | 12.4  |
| Guinea        | -     | -     | 9.22  | 0.53  | 0.23  | 1.17  | -     | -     | -    | -    | 11.1  |
| Togo          | 0.18  | 0.06  | 0.52  | 1.17  | 1.15  | 0.52  | 1.77  | 2.26  | 2.63 | -    | 10.3  |
| Rwanda        | 0.60  | 0.91  | 1.00  | 1.04  | 2.85  | 1.08  | 0.41  | 0.79  | 0.59 | -    | 9.3   |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 3.18  | 0.67  | 0.55  | 0.51  | 0.61  | 0.17  | 0.12  | 0.12  | 0.12 | -    | 6.0   |
| Madagascar    | 0.30  | 0.16  | 0.20  | 0.62  | 0.02  | 0.04  | 1.71  | 0.32  | 1.19 | -    | 4.6   |
| Senegal       | 1.00  | 0.33  | 0.16  | 0.15  | 0.30  | 0.35  | 0.18  | 0.47  | 0.66 | 0.69 | 4.3   |
| DRC           | -     | -     | -     | -     | 1.56  | 0.25  | 0.66  | 0.85  | 0.27 | 0.52 | 4.1   |
| Botswana      | 0.00  | -     | -     | 0.80  | 0.38  | -     | 0.01  | 0.02  | 0.33 | 0.00 | 1.5   |
| Mauritius     | 0.57  | 0.06  | 0.02  | 0.01  | 0.02  | 0.00  | 0.02  | 0.33  | 0.07 | -    | 1.1   |
| Cameroon      | 0.19  | 0.05  | 0.02  | 0.17  | 0.21  | 0.19  | 0.23  | -     | -    | -    | 1.1   |
| Sierra Leone  | -     | -     | -     | -     | 0.50  | 0.09  | 0.07  | 0.41  | -    | -    | 1.1   |
| Kenya         | -     | -     | 0.16  | -     | 0.14  | -     | -     | -     | -    | -    | 0.3   |
| Namibia       | -     | -     | 0.00  | 0.21  | 0.00  | -     | 0.00  | 0.00  | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.3   |
| Lesotho       | 0.02  | 0.07  | 0.00  | 0.00  | -     | -     | -     | -     | -    | -    | 0.1   |
| Sudan         | -     | -     | -     | 0.01  | 0.06  | -     | -     | -     | -    | -    | 0.1   |

Source: UN Comtrade Database



**Table 2: Export of Goods from North Korea, figures in US\$ millions (ranked by total in descending order)**

| Country       | 2011  | 2012 | 2013  | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Total |
|---------------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| South Africa  | 46.74 | 8.25 | 1.43  | 3.40 | 2.72 | 5.24 | 1.97 | 1.29 | 2.25 | 0.46 | 73.7  |
| Nigeria       | -     | -    | 24.05 | 0.57 | 0.01 | -    | -    | -    | 0.50 | -    | 25.1  |
| Senegal       | 0.13  | 0.76 | 0.17  | 0.52 | 7.82 | 0.49 | 2.48 | 1.53 | 1.02 | 0.18 | 15.1  |
| Egypt         | 9.17  | 1.31 | 0.77  | 1.68 | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.05 | 0.08 | -    | 0.13 | 13.9  |
| Uganda        | 0.38  | 2.23 | 1.68  | 2.32 | 0.10 | 1.34 | 0.21 | 1.03 | -    | 0.25 | 9.5   |
| Guinea        | -     | -    | 1.57  | 1.42 | 2.81 | 3.51 | -    | -    | -    | -    | 9.3   |
| Burkina Faso  | -     | 0.00 | 0.00  | 6.47 | 0.64 | 0.72 | 0.42 | -    | -    | -    | 8.2   |
| DRC           | -     | -    | -     | -    | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 7.08 | 7.3   |
| Zambia        | 0.00  | 0.00 | 0.01  | 5.16 | -    | -    | 0.00 | 0.45 | 0.61 | 0.00 | 6.2   |
| Tanzania      | 0.69  | 1.85 | 0.07  | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.64 | 2.25 | 0.01 | -    | -    | 5.7   |
| Benin         | -     | 0.02 | -     | 0.68 | 2.58 | 0.01 | 0.33 | 1.01 | 0.20 | -    | 4.8   |
| Mozambique    | 0.00  | 0.97 | 0.02  | 0.81 | -    | 0.01 | 0.12 | 2.08 | -    | -    | 4.0   |
| Cameroon      | 0.01  | 0.38 | 2.97  | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0.02 | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3.6   |
| Ethiopia      | 0.09  | 0.06 | 0.19  | 0.02 | 0.50 | 1.05 | 0.93 | 0.45 | -    | -    | 3.3   |
| Togo          | -     | -    | -     | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3.16 | 0.01 | -    | 3.2   |
| Ghana         | 0.01  | 0.02 | 0.64  | 0.55 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1.2   |
| Rwanda        | 0.58  | 0.10 | 0.02  | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.01 | -    | 0.00 | 0.23 | -    | 1.2   |
| Seychelles    | 0.01  | -    | -     | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.77 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -    | 0.8   |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 0.04  | 0.03 | -     | -    | 0.50 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.6   |
| Madagascar    | -     | 0.01 | 0.01  | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0.05 | -    | 0.3   |
| Mali          | 0.01  | 0.17 | -     | -    | -    | -    | 0.00 | -    | -    | -    | 0.2   |
| Sierra Leone  | -     | -    | -     | -    | 0.05 | 0.07 | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.1   |
| Zimbabwe      | 0.06  | -    | 0.00  | -    | 0.00 | -    | 0.01 | -    | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.1   |
| Kenya         | -     | -    | 0.01  | -    | 0.08 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.1   |
| Lesotho       | 0.04  | -    | -     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.0   |
| Namibia       | -     | -    | 0.00  | -    | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -    | -    | -    | 0.0   |
| Angola        | -     | -    | -     | -    | -    | 0.01 | -    | 0.00 | -    | -    | 0.0   |
| Botswana      | -     | -    | -     | -    | -    | 0.01 | 0.00 | -    | -    | 0.00 | 0.0   |
| Mauritius     | -     | 0.00 | -     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.0   |
| Algeria       | -     | -    | -     | -    | 0.00 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.0   |

Source: UN Comtrade Database

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Registered as a non-profit organization in Kenya, the Sochin Research Institute is an independent think tank and program implementer that conducts research covering international affairs and theoretical debates in the field of Africa-Asian relations and area studies. This includes intercontinental relations in the fields of security, diplomacy, economy, political networks, and societal connections.

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