Political Culture and Collective Action:

Applying South Korea's Democratization Model to Iran's Green Movement

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ABSTRACT

Why did Iran's Green Movement in 2009 and South Korea's democratization movement in 1987 led to divergent outcomes? This paper utilizes the within-case study analysis methodology called process-tracing to examine socio-political events that underlied these two movements. The analysis shows that both movements shared several conditions that led to the formation of social and political capital, yet this paper argues that the causal relationships between independent variables revealed two vastly different political cultures. Compared to Iran, South Korea's political culture was homogenized, although a temporary one, with the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP)'s successful consolidation of the nation's various civic groups, including radical student groups, for the purpose of eliciting support from the middle-class. South Korea's dissident politicians formed a united opposition front and a consolidated protest theme. Therefore, the formation of the NKDP and its electoral alignment with civil-society groups led to a mass mobilization, which was focused and targeted with centripetal momentum. In contrast, Iran's opposition forces were fragmented and lacked synchronized protest themes. While the Guardian Council's enormous influence vetted the number of reform-minded candidates, Iran's political culture witnessed a wide spectrum of differing political ideals and attitudes. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi advocated the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic while many of Iran's young men and women aimed to bring down the very system of which the Green Movement leaders were a part. In addition, Iran's constitution is viewed to lack the democratic notions that are understood in the western sense of the political culture framework. In the end, Mousavi was criticized for failing to co-opt the support of civic-society groups in Iran, including ordinary Iranian citizens. Nevertheless, the Green Movement represented

Iran's poly-vocal culture in which a plethora of diverse political ideals and attitudes was embedded and which Iran's opposition politicians can attempt to accommodate by moderating and splintering their stance.

Key Words: Green Movement, protest, collective action, democratization movement, process tracing

I. Introduction

The presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 14, 2013 resulted in the cleric and moderate politician Hassan Rouhani receiving more than 50% of the votes and winning by a large margin. Rouhani campaigned around a message of hope and change which could have significant implications on both domestic and foreign policy.

However, it remains to be seen if the changes will be as profound as seen possible just four years ago when the so-called Green Movement arose in reaction to allegations that the Ministry of Interior rigged the presidential election of June 12, 2009 in favor of the incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Widespread and prolonged protests erupted following that election, which aimed to reverse Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election. On June 15, 2009, opposition party leader Mir Hossein Mousavi rallied in Tehran with anywhere from several hundred thousand to three million of his supporters. The wave of demonstrations that followed the contested election was the largest in Iran's 30-year history. During the protest, women, youth, students and members of the moderate clerical establishment took to the streets in the thousands chanting and wearing the bright green campaign colors of Mousavi, thus showing support for the Green Movement.[1] According to Tehran's conservative mayor, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, more than 3 million people protested in the wake of this year's June 12 election.[2] The movement, however, lost momentum when the state cracked down via arrests of opposition reformist politicians

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1) Mehdi Khalaji, 2009, "Who's Really Running Iran's Green Movement," Foreign Policy.

2) Khalaji (2009).

and student demonstration leaders. During the ensuing six months, protests occurred on public holidays and on national commemorations. By the beginning of 2010 the leaders of the Green Movement called off a demonstration planned for the February 11 anniversary of the revolution. A few months later the Arab Spring democratization movement spread eastwards from the Maghreb to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Even though the Green Movement of 2009 could be seen as a precursor to the Arab Spring, its significance inside Iran has disappeared altogether and Mousavi remains under house arrest.[3]

The failure of the Green Movement contrasts starkly with successful breakthrough protests in other countries, and it is worth investigating the variables underlying a protest movement's failure or success. The protest movement in South Korea in 1987, particularly, makes for an apt comparison to protests in Iran 22 years later, due to similar socio-economic conditions prevailing at the time in both countries. In June of 1987, South Korea's student protesters were successful in staging a peace march supported by the nation's various civic groups as they gained the support of the middle class. South Korea's mass democratization movement is noted for its unprecedented popular surge, as an estimated 1.5 million ordinary citizens took to the streets with their demands for a pro-democratic agenda.[4] After the peace march, President Chun adopted open presidential elections as part of the regime's constitutional reform package before stepping down.

But why did South Korea's civil rights movement succeed in removing President Chun Do Hwan from office, whereas Iranian protestors failed to reverse President Ahmadinejad's re-election? In attempting to answer this enigma, some pundits postulate the failed Iranian Green Movement was a result of the clerical regime's effective crackdown on social media, or election fraud.[5] Indeed, the Iranian

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3) Abdul Qader Tafesh, 2012, "Iran's Green Movement: Reality and Aspirations," Al Jazeera Center for Studies. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/11/20121159103533337.htm (accessed: 2013. 6. 4).

4) Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

5) Human Rights Watch, 2009, "Iran: Halt the Crackdown," Human Rights Watch. http://malaysiasms. wordpress.com/2009/06/22/iran-halt-the-crackdown/ (accessed: 2011. 4. 14). Michael Collins, 2009, "Iranian Election Fraud 2009: Who Was the Real Target...and Why?," American Politics Journal.

government disabled the SMS features on all cell phones in the country in the months leading up to the presidential election. Allegations of vote rigging and election fraud also ensued after the Iranian Interior Minister announced that President Ahmadinejad had been reelected by a 62% margin, shortly after the polls closed.[6] This news prompted supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi and opposition activists to hold public demonstrations and protests in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

This paper argues that these explanations are *a posteriori* symptoms rather than underlying causes for Iran's failed attempt to usher in a democratization process. Using the method of process-tracing of the socio-political events that took place surrounding Iran's Green Movement and comparing them to South Korea's 1987 democratization movement, this paper delineates the political and social opportunity structures that led to a homogenized political culture, albeit a temporary one, which South Korea's protesters created while the country prodded toward the path of democratization.[7] In contrast, Iran's protesters created a multi-faceted collection of attitudes, beliefs, and values that underlined the concept of legitimacy which was insufficient to inaugurate a significant political change.

Ⅱ. Applying a Within-Case Analysis to Protest Movements in South Korea and Iran

In attempting to analyze the divergent outcomes of the two protest movements outlined above, the theoretical paradigms dominating the study of social movements become a good starting point. Social mobilization theory stresses the political nature of movements and interprets them as conflicts over the allocation of goods in the

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6) Casey Addis, 2009, "Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections," Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf (accessed: 2011. 4. 12).

7) Political culture is used per a definition by Gabriel Almond and Syndey Verba's The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (New Jersey: Princeton, 1963). In this sense, it refers to a collection of attitudes, beliefs and values that underlie a society's political system.

political market.[8] Therefore, political opportunities and alliances established by demonstrators or opposition party leaders become a deciding factor in tipping the balance of power in their favor. In contrast, state-centric theorists of revolutionary movements would argue that the actions of specific types of repressive regimes unwittingly channel popular resistance into radical directions.[9] In the end, the relationship between civil society and social capital necessitates exploration of political contexts such as regime repression, opposition party formation, alliance patterns among civic groups, and U.S. foreign policy. Both of these theoretical paradigms underpin the methodology of process tracing employed for the comparative study presented in this paper.

Process tracing allows for the "systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses by the investigator."[10] Through a deductive analysis of key events during the protest movements of South Korea in 1987 and Iran in 2009, the trajectory of causal relationships between several independent variables will be examined. Process tracing allows for the *a posteriori* identification of independent variables that explain the divergent outcomes evidenced in the protest movements, once they are analyzed as a temporal sequence of explanatory events. Whereas some studies predicate the success of democratic breakthroughs from a previously autocratic regime on the presence of specific domestic or international influences, this paper argues that the interplay of such influences throughout a protest movement plays a vital role in explaining the success or failure of a protest movement.[11]

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8) See Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004). John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 1977, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 1212-1241.

9) See Jeff Goodwin, 1994, "Old Regimes and Revolutions in the Second and Third Worlds: A Comparative Perspective," Social Science History, vol. 18, pp. 575-604. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpal, 1989, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," Politics and Society, vol. 17, pp. 489-507.

10) David Collier, 2011, "Understanding Process Tracing," Political Science and Politics, vol. 44, no. 4, pp.823-830.

11) Ray Salvatore Jennings, 2012, "Democratic Breakthroughs: the Ingredients of Successful Revolts," United States Institute of Peace.

## Ⅲ. Political contexts shared by protest movements in South Korea and Iran

In attempting to explain why one protest movement succeeded while the other failed, this paper compares and contrasts the political cultures underlying the staging of Iran's Green Movement to that of South Korea's Democracy Movement. Specifically, this paper process-traces the conditions of social and political capitals arising from those particular political cultures that demonstrators and opposition party leaders used, or failed to use, in mobilizing contentious collective action against their respective authoritarian regimes. Exploring these internal variables is necessary to underpin the relationship between social movements and democratization or political reform processes in a meaningful manner. South Korea's example is an apt comparison to Iran's case, due to similar socio-political conditions available at the time of their respective civil rights movements: 1) student demonstrators acting as the epitome for change, 2) selective regime repression, and 3) politicized public sentiment.

A stark similarity exists between the members of Iran's Green Movement and South Korea's student demonstrators: In Iran, 70% of the population is less than 30 years old and the "youth population" has been strongly linked to the reformist ideas circulating in the country.[12] Slater Bakhtavar, a journalist, policy analyst and practicing attorney, notes that most of these reformist ideals are formed and passed through dialogue within the university setting. Tehran University, along with 22 universities throughout Iran, served as the launch pad for promoting basic human and civil rights for the Iranian people since the 1990s. It is therefore not surprising that Iran's student demonstrators questioned the legitimacy of President Ahmadinejad's government by staging massive anti-government protests around campuses in the aftermath of the June 2009 presidential pool.

Similarly, the role of South Korea's student-led demonstrations and protests was crucial in mobilizing a civil-rights movement throughout the 1980s. Between May 18-21 of 1980, Chunnam University students formed a remarkable number of networks with other student groups in the region, continually dispersing and regrouping in

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12) Slater Bakhtavar, The Green Movement (Texas: Parsa Enterprises, 2009).

downtown Kwangju in their protest against General Chun's *coups d'état*.[13] As the students continued with their protest against the paratrooper's violent suppression, Kwangju citizens from all walks of life joined the students in protesting the illegitimacy of Chun's presidency. Moreover, South Korea's student protesters improved their demonstration tactics over time.[14] In comparison to the early 1980s when student protests tended to be mostly unorganized, haphazard, and ordinary rock-throwing events, the 1987 social movement witnessed an exponential growth in South Korea's student protest networks as over 200 universities nationwide came together and joined the peace march.[15]

Both the Iranian and Korean civil movements also encountered similar methods of regime repression. On the weekend of June 13 and 14, 2009, the Iranian government applied a series of raids across Tehran, which resulted in the arrest of prominent reformist politicians and student demonstration leaders. The police also stormed the headquarters of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. An estimated 200 students were detained after clashes between riot police and students at Tehran University although many were later released.[16] Although the *Basij* militia and the feared Revolutionary Guards embarked on a wave of beatings and killings in clashes between largely peaceful protesters and government thugs, the mullah regime managed to avoid a response of the magnitude of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing.[17]

Similarly, President Chun refrained from replicating the brutal methods of violence utilized in the Kwangju case toward 1987. The Chun regime made frequent threats of retribution, but it was reluctant to apply repression overtly in its attempt to dislocate the student movement from the purview of general public.

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13) Robert Koehler, 2005, "Gwangju Uprising: Day 1," The Marmot's Hole. http://www.rjkoehler. com/2005/05/18/gwangju-uprising-day-1/ (accessed: 2011. 4. 29).

14) Vincent Brandt, 1987, "The Student Movement in South Korea," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. http://www.globalcollab.org/projects/foia/rok_students.html/?searchterm=None (accessed: 2011. 4. 28).

15) Brandt (1987).

16) Robert Tait and Julian Borger, 2009, "Iran Elections: mass arrests and campus raids as regime hits back," The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/17/iran-election-protests-arrests1 (accessed 2011. 4. 30).

17) Dieter Bednarz, 2009, "End of the Green Revolution? The Power of Iran's Iron Fist," Spiegel Online. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,633144,00.html (accessed: 2011. 12. 11).

Finally, both social movements experienced an unprecedented level of politicized public sentiment. Following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians turned out in record numbers to vote in the presidential election on June 12, 2009. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, praised the public for their enthusiasm and noted that a record number of voters had gathered to vote. Shortly after the election, as Mousavi called the official results a "dangerous charade," thousands of protesters poured into the streets chanting "Where is my vote?" and they accused the incumbent regime of widespread fraud.[18] Looking beyond their borders, Iranian protesters were conflicted about whether an endorsement from the United States would help or hurt their cause. Meanwhile, Washington was hesitant to support the movement fearing that its involvement would create the impression that the U.S. was behind the protests. The academic Hamid Dabashi assessed that the U.S. faced a paradox in dealing with Iran over its nuclear armament: negotiate and thus legitimize Ahmadinejad's troubled presidency, resort to sanctions or military strikes, and destroy the budding civil rights campaign of the Green Movement altogether.[19]

The situation was similar in South Korea's case. Months before the people's democratic march, tens of thousands of students and middle-age citizens filled the streets of Pusan and cheered the dissident leader Kim Young Sam in the biggest anti-government rally since 1980. Students at Chunnam National University firmly believed that the special forces units designed to help the uprising, and the paratroopers that quashed them were within the governance of the U.S. Combined Forces Command.[20] In their belief, the U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea were supporting General Chun directly in the staging of his coup and carrying out his military operations in Kwangju.[21] At the time, most U.S. politicians viewed the incident as a sovereignty issue that belonged to the jurisdiction of South

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18) http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/14/2597534.htm (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

19) Hamad Dabashi, Iran, The Green Movement and the USA: The Fox and the Paradox (London: Zed Books, 2010).

20) Jae-Eui Lee, Kap Su Seol, and Nick Mamatas, Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of Age (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

21) Jinwung Kim, 1989, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes," Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 749-763.

Korea's national security laws. In their view, too, General Chun did not need the U.S. troops' approval to move his paratroopers to Kwangju.[22] Anti-Americanism carried over from the Kwangju incident became a powerful repertoire for student activists throughout the 1980s and 90s, as it helped them to condense their collective grievances into a thematically concrete and catchy frame of protest.

Ⅳ. Independent Variables Affecting the Trajectory of Events in South Korea and Iran

Despite the underlying similarities described above, Iran's social movement was vastly different from South Korea's case, especially in regards to one crucial aspect: the alliance patterns between student demonstrators and opposition party leaders. This article argues that in Iran's case, this alliance was of much more tenuous nature when compared to South Korea's case. To explore this hypothesis, the process tracing begins with a comparison of the political leadership, which is deemed to be a critical independent variable in relation to the events unfolding in June 1987 and June 2009 in South Korea and Iran, respectively. The within-case analysis will then delineate the causal linkages and effects the political leadership had on three other independent variables: 1) the modus operandi of the respective protest movements, 2) the synchronization of protest themes, and 3) the iconic death at the hand of the regime of a protestor in Seoul and Tehran.

1. The Two Kims and Mousavi

Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung's political careers spanned several decades during which time they established themselves as credible opposition politicians. In late 1979, Kim Young Sam was the New Democratic Party's leader bitterly attacking President Park's regime for losing touch with the nation's working-class citizens.[23]

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22) John Adam Wickam, From the "12/12" Incident to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979-1980 (Washington, DC: Nation Defense University Press, 1999).

23) John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development

When Kim Young Sam accused the Park regime for losing authority to govern legitimately because of its moral bankruptcy, President Park responded by sending police force to block opposition legislators from entering the National Assembly chamber. After Kim was expelled from the National Assembly and banned from politics between 1980 and 1985, he undertook a 23-day hunger strike protesting the dictatorship of President Chun.[24]

While Kim Young Sam called for the complete dismantling of President Park's *yushin* system, Kim Dae Jung's National Coalition for Democracy and Unification demanded rapid democratization of South Korea's political institutions and the constitution itself.[25] Kim Dae Jung's political agenda became an embodiment of the Kwangju University students' militant position, since the radical student protesters identified more with Kim Dae-Jung's progressive bourgeois position than with Kim Young Sam's anti-government stance.[26] Kim Dae Jung has been called the "Nelson Mandela of Asia" for his long-standing opposition to South Korea's illegitimate ruling regimes. Throughout Kim Dae Jung's political career, he successfully maneuvered as the nation's leading dissident politician and survived many assassination attempts engineered by the Park regime.

Before the 1985 National Assembly (NA) election, the incumbent regime had lifted restrictions on the political activity of dissident politicians. The opposition party took this opportunity to rapidly organize a consolidated opposition front, and their candidates rallied around their demand for installment of a new sixth constitution before the expiration of President Chun's term.[27] The proposed sixth constitution

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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

24) Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

25) South Korean President Park Chung Hee (1917-1979) set forth the idea of yushin ("revitalization" or "reform") in October 1972. He suspended the national constitution and dissolved the national assembly. Yushin is an idea, policy, and set of actions, which included the inculcation of values supporting the new authoritarian regime as well as institutions designed to repress political opposition and the labor movement. Refer to Byeong-Cheon Lee et al, Developmental Dictatorship and The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea (New Jersey: Homa & Sekey Books, 2005).

26) Kim Dae-Jung's progressive bourgeoisie position is frequently compared in the context of Indonesia's democratic transition.

27) Gi-Wook Shin, Paul Y. Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookyung Kim, 2007, "South Korea's

entailed direct popular elections for the president. An unusually large number of voters, estimated at 20,286,000, showed up to vote during the election which was a 24% increase from the 1981 level.[28] The 1985 NA gave birth to a consolidated opposition party led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam by surprisingly winning 50 seats, whereas the ruling party won only 26 seats.[29] The 1985 NA also served as a platform for South Korea's citizens to experiment with a nascent democratic process, despite the fact that the showcasing of the elections was carried out by the ruling party.

By 1987, both Kims were emboldened by the impressive ballot showings at the 1985 NA elections.[30] They could legitimately position themselves as the nation's genuine opposition party leaders embodying the student demonstrators' demand for democratic change and reform.

Iran's opposition party leader Mir Hossein Mousavi's involvement in the country's political scene traces back to the 1970s. He was one of the pillars of the 1979 revolution. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, Mousavi was appointed to and assumed the position of prime minister of Iran, a position he occupied until the Islamic Republic abolished the post. Mousavi reverted to "political exile" around that time and abstained from politics for nearly 20 years.[31] On March 9, 2009, however, he announced his candidacy for president, and Mousavi was vetted by the Guardian Council which has been playing a central role throughout Iran's political history by consistently disqualifying reform-minded candidates from running for office.

After Ahmadinejad's reelection was confirmed on June 12, 2009, Mousavi was considered the *de facto* front-runner by Green-Movement activists as he quickly

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Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report," Stanford Korea Democracy Project. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22590/KDP_Report_%28final%29-1.pdf (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

28) Eric C. Browne and Sunwoong Kim, 2003, "Regionalism in South Korean National Assembly Elections: A Vote Components Analysis of Electoral Change," University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/kim/www/papers/Korean%20Regionalism_July%202003.pdf (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

29) Eugene C. I. Kim, 1986, "South Korea in 1985: An Eventful Year Amidst Uncertainty," Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 66-77.

30) Kim (1986).

31) http://www.iranchamber.com/history/mmousavi/mir_hossein_mousavi.php (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

gained immense support from the student population. At the same time, Mousavi had been criticized and attacked by some of the protesters in the Diaspora, simply because he was Iran's prime minister for nearly eight years. Supporters of the Mojahedin Khalgh Organization, as well as a segment of the exiled monarchists, also never accepted Mousavi as an opposition leader.[32] Mousavi, therefore, never enjoyed the unequivocal legitimacy as an opposition leader compared to the case of the two Kims in South Korea.

The Guardian Council of the Constitution in Iran is an appointed and constitutionally mandated 12-member council. It is composed of six Islamic faqihs, experts in Islamic Law, and six jurists, specializing in different areas of the law, from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power who are elected by the *Majlis* (the Iranian Parliament).[33] The Guardian Council is tasked with supervising elections and approving candidates and it has been playing a central role in allowing only one interpretation of Islamic values and has consistently disqualified reform-minded candidate from running for office. On 20 May 2009, the Guardian Council officially announced a list of approved candidates, while rejecting a number of registered nominees.[34] Only four candidates were approved by the Guardian Council, out of the 476 men and women who had applied to seek the presidency of Iran in the 2009 election.[35] Mousavi was one of the candidates.

In the months preceding the 2009 election 2009, Iran's opposition forces were in fact split among several renowned political figures: Mir Hossein Mousavi (a former prime minister), Mohammad Khatami (a former president), Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (a former president) and Mehdi Karroubi (a former speaker of the

32) For more information on Mojahedin Khalgh Organization, see http://www.iran.mojahedin.org/ pagesen/index.aspx (accessed: 2011. 4. 30) and http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mek.htm (accessed: 2011. 4. 30). The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. The MEK now advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group's own leadership. Muhammad Sahimi, 2010, "Mousavi, Karroubi, and the Opposition in the Diaspora," Frontline. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/12/mousavi-karroubi-and-the-opposition-in-the-diaspora.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 29).

33) http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-6-2.html (accessed: 2013. 4. 13).

34) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8058884.stm (accessed: 2013. 8. 4).

35) Aresu Eqbali, 2009, "Iranian women need more rights: candidate's wife,".AFP. http://www. google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDD9Q1xNs5VIqwgzYINkyU2y5Upg (accessed: 2013. 8. 4).

majlis). Speculations ran high that Khatami had met Karroubi to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in favor of Mousavi.[36)] It seemed that Iran's reformist figures had been trying to reach a consensus over a single candidate for the reformist camp. To the surprise of many, Khatami withdrew from the race in March for what he described as an effort to avoid a split of the votes for the reformist camp. Karroubi, who headed the National Confidence Party, was the first candidate to announce his bid to run for president. He declared on various occasions his determination to stand until the Election Day, and rejected a call to withdraw from the election in favor of any presidential contender.[37)]

The political figures comprising the Green Movement's leadership also had conflicting ideologies and beliefs around core issues such as returning Iran to the ideals of the late Ayatollah Khomeni and the original principles of the Islamic Republic.[38)] Mousavi was loyal to the ideals of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and did not wish to challenge the existing political order. Some foreign policy analyst believed that had Mousavi come into office following the June 12 presidential election, he would have tried to fix the Islamic Republic's internal and external crises through slight policy amendments and tweaks.[39)] The Iranian opposition forces ultimately failed to consolidate their effort to exert a united front against the incumbent regime and the Green Movement remained a loose coalition of disparate political trends comprised of reformers, conservative pragmatists, moderate conservatives and liberals.[40)]

2. Modus Operandi of the Two Movements

Throughout the 1980s, the capacity of South Korea's student protesters to conduct coordinated and disciplined protest operations improved dramatically. If the 1981-1984 period witnessed small, disparate and unorganized student-led protests, the activism

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36) http://www.payvand.com/news/09/apr/1135.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

37) http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/91185.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 29).

38) Khalaji (2009).

39) Khalaji (2009).

40) Robin Wright, 2009, "Iran's Green Movement," United States Institute of Peace (2009).

scenery dramatically changed toward the mid-1980s when student protesters staged seventy-three demonstrations in one year by conjoining five universities in Seoul.[41] In October of 1986, protest groups mobilized by Kun-Kuk University students invited other student activists from twenty-six universities in regional provinces to stage a four-day nationwide protest.[42] In June of 1987, the *New York Times* reported that fierce clashes between student demonstrators and riot police occurred in Seoul and six other cities, involving more than 60,000 students at forty-five colleges.[43]

South Korea's student recruiters relied heavily on old boy networks to invite new members.[44] Seasoned senior activists attempted to recruit freshmen with whom they had personal, family, and home-town ties. A freshman became an activist candidate after going through an indoctrination process run by campus "circles" which militant student leaders led to propagate the protest themes of radical regime change.[45] At one women's college, there were forty-four circles available for freshmen to choose from.[46] Of those, about 20% were regarded by non-activist students as "consciousness-raising" groups of radical activism.[47]

In nationalizing their radical student protest theme, student activists in Seoul mainly relied on leg work to contact the circle leaders of provincial universities in as Taejon, Inchon, and Kwangju. The horizontal linkages established in this manner became a connective tissue that consolidated the divergent protest circles and protest groups to form the National Federation of Student Associations, also called Chonhakryons.[48] Soon, regional-level Chonhakryons followed suit as they spread their operational

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41) Refer to table 2-2 on page 22 in Gi-Wook Shin, Paul Y. Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookyung Kim, 2007, "South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report," Shorenstein APARC Stanford.

42) http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-31/news/mn-8283_1_riot-police (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

43) Clyde Haberman, 1987, "Violent Protests Rock South Korea," The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/11/world/violent-protests-rock-south-korea.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

44) Vincent Brandt. 1987, "The Student Movement in South Korea," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

45) Brandt (1987).

46) Brandt (1987).

47) Brandt (1987).

48) Hyaeweol Choi, 1991, "The Societal Impact of Student Politics in Contemporay South Korea," Higher Education, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 175-188.

bases in Chunnam, Kyongki, Chungnam, and Jeju Island. By 1985, eighty-four universities and colleges organized the national student Coalition for Democracy Struggle.[49] It was South Korea's largest-scale nationwide student network since the 1960 April student uprising.

Unlike South Korea's student protesters, Iran's students were able to benefit and take advantage of the information revolution. Iran is one of the most-tech savvy societies in the developing world, with an estimated 28 million Internet users.[50] Furthermore, Iran boasts between 60,000 and 110,000 active blogs led by youths, one of the highest numbers in the Middle East.[51] At the height of Iran's Green Revolution, Western media outlets were filled with a flurry of reports of youth protesters using Twitter, e-mail, blogs, and text messages to coordinate rallies, share information, and locate fellow protesters. They expanded their protest platforms through modern telecommunication devices and social media sites such as Skype, Paltalk, Twitter and YouTube. In fact, journalists dubbed the unrest in Tehran as the "Twitter Revolution."[52] The tug of war between Mousavi and the regime was predicated on the prominence of cyberspace social networking.[53] The Green Movement is considered to have expanded the public domain into cyberspace as Iran's overwhelmingly young population increasingly became drawn into the electronically savvy age. When Mousavi declared to his supporters "hat har Irani yek setad" which translates as "every Iranian is a campaign headquarter", he was referring to the resourcefulness of his young supporters.[54]

Despite technological advantages, the umbrella youth movement involved in staging the 1999 student protests experienced fragmentation years before the Green

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49) Sunhyuk Kim, "Civil Society and Democratization," in Charles K. Armstrong, Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 214.

50) Omid Memarian and Tara Nesvaderani, 2010, "Iran's Youth: Agents of Change," United States Institute of Peace.

51) Memarian and Nesvaderani (2010).

52) Jared Keller, 2010, "Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution," The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/ (accessed: 2010. 12. 26).

53) Hamad Dabashi, The Green Movement and the USA: The Fox and the Paradox (London: Zed Books, 2010).

54) Eric Leventhal, 2009, "The Chartreuse of Civil Disobedience in Iran," Headcount. http://www.headcount.org/the-chartreuse-of-civil-disobedience-in-iran/(2011. 4. 30).

Movement over their disagreement in regards to supporting President Khatami and reform. In 2002, Iran's youth organizations split into the Shiraz versus Allameh factions.[55] A minority faction met in Shiraz and elected its own leadership, whereas a majority faction met at Tehran's Allameh Tabatabai University and elected its central council. The Allameh faction favored a boycott of the 2005 presidential election, while Shiraz supported Ahmadinejad. The split continued around the time of the Green Movement and seemed to dovetail with the split within Iran's opposition political leadership. For the 2009 election, Allameh wrote to the four presidential candidates with a list of their protest demands, which included academic freedom, free speech and release of student prisoners.[56] Only Karroubi responded. The Allameh faction formally supported him because of Karroubi's acknowledgment of its existence.

3. Synchronization of protest themes in South Korea versus their misalignment in Iran

By 1987, South Korea's opposition party leaders successfully co-opted the support of South Korea's various civic groups, including radical student organizations in their quest to orchestrate a concerted and synchronized opposition front. The Chun regime's breakdown and a democratic transition process seemed to begin in earnest with the formation of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) and its electoral alignment with the nation's big and small civil-society groups.[57] The NKDP launched a large-scale national campaign to collect ten million signatures in support of a constitutional revision. Many civil society groups, particularly youth and student organizations, openly supported this gesture and vigorously campaigned for the NKDP. It was the first time since the early 1960s that university students overtly supported a particular political party. Its sheer numbers, totaling approximately ten million petitioners, was almost half the size the electorate and a quarter of the entire population.[58]

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55) Memarian and Nesvaderani (2010).

56) Tara Nesvaderani, 2010, "Iran's Youth: The Protests Are Not Over," United States Institute of Peace.

57) Kim (2002).

58) Il Joon Chung, "Demilitarizing politics in South Korea: Toward a positive consolidation of civilian supremacy," in Giuseppe Caforio (eds.), Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in

The NKDP-driven coalitions of civil-society groups, which included dissident politicians, student protesters, and middle-class citizens, outlived the momentum of the 1985 NA elections and developed into a grand democratization movement in June of 1987. The 1987 peace march was a follow-on collective civic action to the 1986 rallies, prompted by the NKDP's failure to pass the constitutional reform at the 1985 NA.[59]

The size and ferocity of the signature-drive seemed to have astonished the Chun regime, as the police carried out a series of harsh crackdowns by raiding the NKDP headquarters and the offices of other civic groups. The Chun regime preferred the method of electing a new president in the spring of 1988 under the existing fifth constitution. It wished to defer any talk of new constitutional reform until after the completion of the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics.[60]

The unfolding of the signature drive coincided with the change of sentiment among South Korea's middle-class citizens. Ordinary citizens showed aloofness toward radical student protesters in previous years, but there was a dramatic shift in the middle-class sentiment in 1987. For instance, an increasing number of middle-class workers dressed in office suits was witnessed to come out of the building near the cathedral, where the location was reported to have been the meeting place for student protesters.[61] Susan Chira's interviews with 17 middle-class citizens in Seoul and the South Eastern city of Pusan in June of 1987 suggest that many ordinary citizens were increasingly discontent with the ruling party.[62] A 58 year old woman interviewed by Chira said," I am here because I was so outraged by President Chun's decision to postpone constitutional revision. He should have asked people

Honor of Charles C. Moskos (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009), pp. 527-555.

59) William Stueck, 1998, "Democratization in Korea: The United States Roles, 1980 and 1987," International Journal of Korean Studies II, no. 1, pp. 1-26.

60) Eugene C. Kim, 1987, "South Korea in 1986: Preparing for a Power Transition," Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 64-74.

61) Michael Breen, The Koreans: Who They Are, What they Want, Where Their Future Lies. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), p. 146.

62) Susan Chira, 1987, "For Korean Middle Class, a Process of Politicization," The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/19/world/for-korean-middle-class-a-process-of-politicization.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 27).

their opinion, but he didn't."[63] Many ordinary citizens seemed incensed by the Chun regime's April announcement of canceling a debate on constitutional reform and emboldened enough to join radical student protests.

In comparison, Iran's opposition political leaders chose a more moderate approach. Iran's religious democrats considered the Green Movement a civil rights movement rather than a revolutionary one. They wanted to work from within the system, reforming laws through deals with the existing clusters of power in the Islamic Republic.[64] The religious faction under Mousavi and Karroubi emerged as the dominant face of the Green Movement. Its strategy was to avoid pushing for dramatic regime change and focus instead on its poor economic performance, abuse of power, corruption, and human rights issues. In a speech at a UK university, Mousavi's senior advisor described the Green Movement "as a pluralistic movement with no centralized leadership command centre and a modus operandi of non-violent struggle based on tolerance of other views and adherence to basic human rights principles."[65] Similarly, the academic Fariborz Ghadar opined on the unrest issue in Iran after the elections in the following manner:

> The opposition is asking for a reelection; they are not asking for regime change, either. The opposition wants a marginally more accommodating foreign policy, a more effective and efficient economic policy, and more freedom for women and the younger population. Up to now, this does not seem like a revolution, based on the demands of the opposition. This is, as a colleague of mine mentioned, more a request for a "nip and tuck".[66]

The misalignment of protest themes furthermore ran between Mousavi and the supporters outside of Iran who identified with the secular liberal social democratic factions of the Green Movement inside Iran. This outside group is referred to as the "Diaspora Opposition," and it offers criticisms on the strategy of Mousavi's religious

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63) Chira (1987).

64) Jonathan Paris, Prospects for Iran (London: Legatum Institute, 2011).

65) Azarmehr, 2010, "Ardeshir Amir Arjomand, Moussavi's Advisor at UCL," Azarmehr Blogspot. http://azarmehr.blogspot.com/2010/12/ardeshir-amir-arjomand-moussavis.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

66) Fariborz Ghadar, 2009, "Iran at the Crossroads," Center for Strategic & International Studies.

faction.[67] In line with some of the radical student protesters' themes, the "Diaspora Opposition" opposed Mousavi's decision to limit his goals to reform within the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the group presented criticism of the Supreme Leader as a popular demand of the people, whereas Mousavi chose not to target the supreme leader as his opposition strategy. The manifesto published by a group of exiled religious intellectuals and university professors suggests that the movement will not settle for anything short of radical change. Specifically, the group demanded the resignation of the incumbent leadership, introduction of broad democratic freedoms, prosecution of security forces engaged in violence against the protesters and an end to politics in the military, universities and the clergy.[68]

Finally, and unlike the moderate sentiment of Iran's opposition party leaders, the students had extreme views on what it meant for Iran to be democratic. Iran's youth represents social and political agents of dramatic change, and the sheer numbers of young people posed a threat to the regime's status quo.[69] Historically, the Iranian youth's idea about democracy has proven to not deal much with gradual and incremental changes and reforms. Iran's youth bloc has been politically active since the 1953 ouster of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh as it has been shaped by a myriad of political and military crises. By 1997, Iran's youth helped elect reformist President Mohammad Khatami. At this point, Iran's youth bulge had increasingly become pivotal in dictating the outcome of Iran's 1997 presidential elections. Khatami was a supporter of student organizations during the months leading up to the presidential election, hoping that he could utilize the student protest groups in pushing his own political agenda.[70] Student protesters backed out, however, as he failed to produce a dramatic change.

The months that led up to the student protests of July 1999 witnessed increasing political unrest within the student population, mainly in the city of Tehran, as radical reformist ideas circulated the university. The students of Tehran University

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67) Robin Wright, 2010, "An Opposition Manifesto in Iran," Los Angeles Times. http://articles. latimes.com/2010/jan/06/opinion/la-oe-wright6-2010jan06 (accessed: 2011. 4. 25).

68) Wright (2010).

69) Memarian and Nesvaderani (2010).

70) Bakhtavar (2009).

were convinced that the fundamentalist theories of the Islamic Republic were robbing Iran's citizens of their most basic human rights. Bakhtavar believes that the Iranian youth has been harboring the notion that the Islamic Republic must be overthrown in order for a true democracy to take root in Iran. The subsequent partial youth boycott in the 2005 presidential election was a key to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election.[71]

Following the June 2009 presidential election, Iran's youth activists used holidays and commemorative events as their framing device in launching collection action. After student protesters organized protests by framing the death of Neda as the symbol of their uprising during the first phase, the second phase witnessed youth protests gathering momentum by politicizing Iran's national and religious holidays. In the Iranian city of Qom on December 19, for instance, there were massive demonstrations honoring Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who had become Iran's iconic opposition cleric.[72] Montazeri had become a symbolic presence for Iran's radical student-led opposition groups as his life reflected the fringe ideas and a trajectory of many revolutionaries.

4. Death of Park Chong-Chol and Neda Agha Soltan

Both protest movements were marked by the death of a young protestor which ignited much outrage and fury from the population and opposition politicians alike. The tragic deaths of the Korean and the Iranian protestor by the hands of the ruling regime occurred at critical moments of the respective June protest movements and they could have resulted in similar ramifications. Yet the causal relationship between these deaths, the opposition leadership, and the regime response produced vastly different trajectories and repercussions.

In mid-January of 1987, the incumbent regime's Democratic Justice Party (DJP) members attempted to persuade the NKDP members, led by Kim Dae Jung and

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71) Memarian and Nesvaderani (2010) and Mark Gasiorowski, "The Causes and Consequences of Iran's June 2005 Presidential Election," Strategic Insights IV, no 8 (2005), pp. 1-8.

72) Ray Takeyh, 1988, "Opposition Ferment and Fragmentation in Iran," Council on Foreign Relations (2009). http://www.cfr.org/iran/opposition-ferment-fragmentation-iran/p21038 (accessed: 2011. 4. 28).

Kim Young-Sam, to accept the ruling party's proposal for a parliamentary form of government in return for some democratic reforms.[73] The NKDP was split between members who adamantly advocated a presidential system with direct popular votes, and members who were willing to compromise and accept the DJP's proposal. In the midst of this political impasse, Park Chong-Chol, a Seoul National University protester and president of the student council in the linguistics department, died on January 14, 1987 during police interrogation.[74] The government officials who examined Park's case initially reported to the press that Park died of stress. The autopsy of his body, however, confirmed that Park died from torture. The Catholic Priest's Association for Justice disclosed to the public on May 18, 1987 that the authorities had attempted to cover up the true cause of Park's death. The full disclosure served as a focal point for massive anti-government demonstrations that ensued in the following months. Moreover, the incident galvanized the splintered opposition party and put the ruling party on the defensive.[75]

Similarly, one particular event in Tehran on June 20, 2009 instantly caught the attention of the world's media. A bystander's mobile phone captured graphic footage of a 26 year-old woman, Neda Agha Soltan, being shot in the chest, allegedly by *Basji* snipers. The video was quickly broadcasted over the Internet and her death was described as "the most widely witnessed death in human history."[76] CNN ran a pixilated version of the video, which was posted on YouTube. Another amateur video captured images of Neda and her music teacher attending what appeared to be a peaceful protest. People on Twitter started to form a discussion group to post their comments about her death and the media coverage of the killing.[77] The

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73) Sung-joo Han, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization," Asian Survey 28, no. 1, pp. 52-61.

74) Mark Clifford, Troubled tiger: businessmen, bureaucrats, and generals in South Korea (Armonk: An East Gate Book, 1998), p. 267.

75) Clyde Haberman, 1987, "Seoul Student's Torture Death Changes Political Landscape," The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/31/world/seoul-student-s-torture-death-changes-political-landscape.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

76) Krista Mahr, "Neda Agha-Soltan," Time (2009). http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1945379_1944701_1944705,00.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

77) CNN, "'Neda' becomes rallying cry for Iranian protests," CNN (2009). http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-21/world/iran.woman.twitter_1_neda-peaceful-protest-cell-phone?_s=PM:WORLD

graphic image of her death uploaded to YouTube fueled the Green Movement with a renewed political force. The fact that she was at the scene of the demonstration by chance, due to a traffic jam, fueled the viewers' fury and outrage.

Although the political impact of the two events on energizing the people's movement seems similar, the responses originating from the respective incumbent regimes were vastly different. In Neda's case, Iranian authorities were reluctant to release her body and agreed to do so only under the condition that her family gives her a burial service outside of Tehran.[78] The government warned all the mosques in the area against holding a memorial service for her. Everybody seemed affected by the iconic death of Neda, except for Iran's incumbent leaders. Park Chong Chol's death, on the other hand, forced the Chun regime to admit, for the first time in South Korea's police history, that its policemen had behaved brutally.[79] As a result, the two policemen involved in the torture were charged with murder. Unlike Neda's case, Park's death prompted an anti-government fervor from the press, student protesters and dissident politicians alike, which the incumbent regime could not ignore, as it had done in their previous dealings with the death of dissident activists. As the student demonstrations intensified over Park's death, President Chun went a step further. He expressed his personal regret and dismissed the Minister of Home Affairs and the national police chief from their positions.[80] President Chun also established a special commission for the protection of human rights for dissident politicians and protesters. Police investigators were consequently barred from taking dissident activists into custody without obtaining warrants.

V. Conclusion

This paper juxtaposed the socio-political events and causal relationships that epitomized Iran's 2009 Green Movement and South Korea's 1987 democratization

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(accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

78) Bakhtavar (2009).

79) Haberman (1987).

80) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963462,00.html (accessed: 2011. 4. 30).

movement. Despite several parallels in the political contexts that governed the dynamics between protesters and the regime (i.e., student demonstrators acting as change agent, disputed legitimacy of the incumbent leadership, and politicized public sentiment), South Korea's democratization movement vastly differed from Iran's Green Movement in the alliance patterns established between opposition party leaders and student protesters. However, it would be difficult to argue that South Korea's political culture in June of 1987 is the recipe for success in bringing an authoritarian regime towards the path of democratization. After all, South Korea's opposition party leaders decided to split during the election campaign, to the dismay of student protesters, and the ruling party's candidate won the 1987 presidential election.

Compared to Iran, South Korea's political culture was homogenized-although it was a temporary alignment-with the NKDP's successful role in consolidating the nation's various civic groups, including radical student groups, for the purpose of eliciting support from the middle-class. South Korea's dissident politicians formed a united opposition front and a consolidated protest theme. Therefore, the formation of the NKDP and its electoral alignment with civil-society groups led to a mass mobilization which was focused and targeted with centripetal momentum.

In contrast, Iran's opposition forces were fragmented and lacked synchronized protest themes. While the Guardian Council's enormous influence contributed towards restricting the number of reform-minded candidates, Iran's political culture witnessed a wide spectrum of differing political ideals and attitudes. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi were former high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic. They were naturally loyal to the ideals of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and advocated the original principles of the Islamic Republic.[81] In contrast, Iran's many of young men and women were aiming to bring down the very system of which the green movement leaders were a part.[82] In addition, Iran's constitution is viewed to lack the democratic notions that are understood in the framework of the Western mindset of political culture.[83]

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81) Khalaji (2009).
82) Khalaji (2009).
83) Khalaji (2009).

In the end, Mousavi was criticized for failing to co-opt the support of a wide spectrum of civic-society groups in Iran, including ordinary Iranian citizens. Nevertheless, the Green Movement in many ways represented the return of a political culture that had brought about the 1977-79 revolution as well as the multifaceted and poly-vocal culture of Iran's cosmopolitan worldliness.[84] Iran's opposition politicians can attempt to accommodate this complex political culture by moderating and splintering their stance. Although President Ahmadinejad's reelection in 2009 interrupted the hope for political change, as symbolized by the Green Movement, Iran's ordinary people possessed a renewed and refined view of opposition and reform. Despite expectations to the contrary, Iranian voter turn-out in the 2013 presidential election was high at 73%[85] and the election was not engineered by the Guardian Council or through voter arrangement.

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84) Dabashi (2010), p. 214.

85) http://www.asiantribune.com/node/62860 (accessed: 2013. 6. 16). http://www.ncr-iran.org/en/election-news-update/13903-iranian-regime-warns-its-media-not-to-brand-election-a-engineered (accessed 2013.6. 16).

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국문초록

국문초록제목

국문이름 / 소속

본 논문에서는 2009년 이란의 녹색 혁명을 둘러싸고 발생했던 사회정치적 사건들의 발생 과정을 내부사례분석과 과정추적방법을 통해 추적하고 이를 1987년 한국의 민주화 과정과 비교한다. 저항운동 참여자들과 정권 사이의 역학 관계를 지배하는 정치적 맥락상의 공통점에도 불구하고 한국의 민주화 운동은 야당 지도자들과 학생 시위자들 사이의 연합 패턴에 있어서 이란의 녹색 혁명과 크게 상이하였다. 한국의 저항 세력은 반정부 연합 세력이 헌법 개정이라는 주제를 둘러싸고 학생 조직들을 포함한 다양한 시민 그룹들을 동원하는 데 있어 성공을 거두게 하는 단일한 정치 문화를 창출해 내었다. 이와는 반대로, 이란의 반정부 세력은 서로 상반되는 저항의 주제와 전술이라는 다면적인 문화를 창출하였으나 파편화되고 구심력을 결핍하였다.

주제어: 녹색 혁명, 저항, 집단행동, 민주화 운동, 과정 추적